Since the end of World War II, Europe has been shifting and growing into a more unified entity, with the European Union (EU) emerging as a potential challenge to the United States' position as sole superpower. After two devastating world wars, European leaders sought to restrain conflict by establishing the Council of Europe in 1949 and proposing an economic community in 1950, aiming to bind economies together to prevent war. Through treaties like the Treaty of Paris (1951), the Treaty of Rome (1957), and the Maastricht Treaty (1992), a framework was created to unite Europe economically. However, many European elites, dissatisfied with the current free-trade zone, are pushing to transform the EU into a full-fledged state, requiring a constitution to define its government and policies. In 2005, the first attempt at a European Constitution was rejected by the Dutch and French, and a revised version, the Lisbon Treaty, was also rejected by Ireland in a referendum, despite not requiring a public vote. The message from these rejections is clear: while Europeans may tolerate the EU bureaucracy and enjoy economic benefits, they resist a supranational government that might subjugate their national identities. For the Lisbon Treaty to be ratified, all 27 member states needed to agree, but the EU remains far from statehood, with political union appearing increasingly unlikely due to diverse economies, historical divisions, and varying national views on politics, trade, and defense. Trust among member states, many of whom were at war for much of the last century, remains low, and the union seems to have reached its limit in terms of integration. Indications suggest that some ties binding the EU are loosening as states prioritize their own interests. Smaller states lack the influence to push for a governing document, and while Germany has driven efforts like the Lisbon Treaty, France, holding the EU presidency in July, prefers looser policies and will not pursue a new treaty. Britain, the next major country to hold the presidency, will not do so until 2017, by which time the EU's demographic challenges may overshadow any push for statehood. Demographic trends show an aging EU population, with life expectancy increasing but a birth rate of only 1.5 per woman, far below the 2.1 needed for stability. To maintain the workforce and support retirees, the EU requires 1.5 to 3 million immigrants annually, potentially totaling 13.5 to 27 million by 2017. These immigrants, largely from Middle Eastern and North African nations, are increasing the Muslim population in countries like France, Germany, and Italy, raising concerns about cultural integration. As evidenced by events like the 2005 cartoon riots and car burnings in Paris suburbs, assimilation remains a challenge. If the EU persists for another nine years, addressing these cultural tensions may take precedence over forming a super-state.

The EU Observer in Brussels reported that EU foreign ministers altered the wording of a statement concerning the Danish cartoon controversy at the urging of Dutch foreign minister Bernard Bot, who sought to avoid any implication of an EU apology to the Muslim world. For weeks, the EU Council had been drafting a statement to present a unified stance on the cartoon uproar. The original text, which stated that the EU council acknowledges and regrets that these cartoons caused offence to Muslims across the world, was revised to say that the EU council acknowledges and regrets that these cartoons were considered offensive and distressing by Muslims across the world. While some view this as a preservation of freedom of speech with no formal apology issued, critics of the Brussels bureaucracy see it as a prime example of Europe's current state, with politicians debating over semantics while crises unfold around them.

There is a persistent call for a strong military power to arise in Europe, with recent advocacy for a European army led by French President Emmanuel Macron. He argues that the European Union (EU), comprising 27 member states, needs its own military due to the perceived unreliability of the US as an ally, citing issues like the US exit from Afghanistan and pressures over China. However, the EU faces significant internal disagreement on this matter. While some member states support the idea of an independent European army, others prefer the security of the NATO alliance and are reluctant to fund a new military initiative, often due to financial constraints and bloated social programs. Many EU countries, including Germany, the largest economy in the EU, spend far below the required defense budgets, with Germany allocating only 1.53% of its GDP to defense in 2020. Reports highlight severe deficiencies in German military readiness, with critical equipment shortages and maintenance issues rendering much of their forces ineffective. France and other European nations fare little better, lacking the resources to field a substantial army. Despite aspirations for a formidable European military, the current reality shows limited capability, with only a small Rapid Reaction Force of about 10,000 men in place. Most EU nations, except for Poland and Belgium, which are committed to NATO integration, struggle to contribute effectively to a unified defense force.

For the last fifty years, the Franco-German partnership has been the bedrock of European power, yet their interests are beginning to diverge. France has been a main proponent of the European Union (EU), using it to keep most of Europe bound together while maintaining a dominant role. However, the EU is far from united, with member states entangled in bureaucratic red tape from Brussels, stagnating economies, and lacking a unified voice in foreign affairs. The CIA has predicted the potential collapse of the EU within 15 years, partly based on France's decisions, as the EU is seen as a primarily French creation to preserve and enhance French power in Europe. In crises, France could either write a new constitution or violently dismantle the EU, suggesting Europe may face an explosive collapse. For any strength to arise in Europe—political, economic, or military—the old institutions will have to fall, and a Franco-German divergence could mark the beginning of such a reorganization.

As the world's recession deepens and America's financial struggles become apparent, some believe that a united Europe, led by Germany, will swiftly emerge as the dominant economic power. However, this perspective ignores critical issues. Europe faces its own sub-prime mortgage and unemployment crises, with major financial institutions suffering losses comparable to those in the U.S., ranging from $138-200 billion. The eurozone's unemployment rate stands slightly higher at 8.0% compared to the U.S. rate of 7.2%. Additionally, the eurozone's policy of setting low interest rates has led to unsustainable growth in smaller countries, with Spain exemplifying this through a real-estate boom fueled by cheap credit, now resulting in foreclosures and a 14.4% unemployment rate. European housing markets, overheated even more than the U.S., await price corrections, and the central role of banks in Europe's economy means banking losses impact all businesses. The direct links between European banks and businesses, while protective against minor shocks, exacerbate the crisis when billions are written down, drying up funds for businesses. The European Union's structure, with 27 diverse economies and bureaucracies, hinders a unified response to the crisis. The European Central Bank lacks the power to set broad financial policy, only adjusting interest rates, which benefits some nations while harming others. During recent eurozone meetings, nationalism prevailed over solidarity, with no Europe-wide solutions offered, leaving each nation to pursue its own path under overarching policies that can both help and hinder. Designed for prosperity, the EU and its bureaucracy, including the ECB, lack real power in crises, deferring to major capitals like Berlin and Paris. The EU remains far from a federalized state capable of cohesive action, unable to even agree on a founding document. Despite expectations for Germany to lead, it rejected a proposal for an economic government that would provide political direction to the eurozone, unwilling to sacrifice national sovereignty or bear the financial burden of supporting weaker economies. Compounded by vulnerability to a resurgent Russia using natural gas exports as leverage, forcing individual energy deals, Europe is neither united nor immune to the market forces and weaknesses of the fractional reserve economy it shares with the U.S. Currently, Europe is not positioned to rise, nor is Germany able to assume effective leadership while tied to a struggling eurozone economy.

The inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania into the European Union on January 1, 2007, marks a significant turning point in its history, though not necessarily in a positive light. Strategic Forecasting (Stratfor) notes that their addition will transform the fundamental character of the union more than any previous members, potentially ushering in its downfall as a political grouping. The accession is attractive to the EU as it brings the Balkans further under Western influence and provides access to the Black Sea for strategic and economic benefits. However, this expansion poses challenges for core states like France and Germany, who have historically driven the EU politically and economically. With a 27-member union, the voting balance shifts, allowing other states to override a Franco-German veto, diminishing their control over union-wide decisions. France, in particular, faces growing difficulties in manipulating the EU to serve its interests. The French, along with the Dutch, rejected the EU constitution, signaling discontent with the direction of the union. Additionally, French leadership, including Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin, has challenged the European Central Bank's authority over monetary policy, advocating for policies that favor French exporters and preserve aspects of its social welfare state. With Bulgaria and Romania's pro-America and pro-free-market stances, France's ability to influence EU policy is further constrained. Stratfor suggests that many French leaders are beginning to question France's rationale for remaining in groupings like the eurozone or even the EU itself. For France to stay in the union long-term, either the other member states must accede to French desires, or France must accept a diminished role, neither of which seems likely. The CIA warned in 2004 of the potential collapse of the EU within fifteen years, largely hinging on France's decisions. As a primarily French creation aimed at preserving and enhancing French power in Europe, the EU's fate may depend on whether France chooses to rewrite its structure or dismantle it entirely, potentially leading to an explosive collapse. If France already views the EU as having outlived its usefulness, such a timeline may be overly optimistic.

Under cover of Denmark's recent decision to reject the Maastricht treaty, nine member nations of the European Community took a significant step toward a unified military force. On June 19, representatives of the nine-member Western European Union signed a document revitalizing the dormant organization, pledging to send peacekeeping forces to troubled areas under UN sanctions. Analysts noted that the European Community's goal in reviving the Western European Union is to transform it into united Europe's defense arm. With the United States diminishing its presence in the region, the European Community sees a growing need for its own military force to protect its interests on the continent and abroad. German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe stated that troops could initially be sent where NATO troops could not, such as into the former USSR. At the least, the Western European Union allows the European Community to act independently of NATO and U.S. restrictions. Formation of a strong European Community demands a military option. For now, the Western European Union is a defense or security pact, deployed only to protect, but the European Community is preparing an offensive weapon, ready to be used by a leader with more aggressive aims.